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In recent years questions about U.S. capital formation have increasingly
become a major focus of both public and private concern. Such questions
inevitably deal in large part with the economy's corporate sector. Since
World War II, business corporations consistently have accounted for
about three-quarters of all investment in plant and equipment in the
United States. As a result, corporate behavior—including corporations'
physical investment decisions and their corresponding financial deci-
sions—constitutes a primary determinant of the economy's overall capi-
tal formation process and performance.
The research reported in this volume represents the second stage of a
wide-ranging National Bureau of Economic Research effort to investi-
gate "The Changing Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital
Formation." The first group of studies sponsored under this project,
which have been published individually and summarized in a 1982 volume
bearing the same title (Friedman 1982), addressed several key issues
relevant to corporate sector behavior along with such other aspects of the
evolving financial underpinnings of U.S. capital formation as household
saving incentives, international capital flows, and government debt man-
agement. In the project's second series of studies, presented at a National
Bureau of Economic Research conference in January 1983 and published
here for the first time along with the commentaries from that conference,
the central focus is the financial side of capital formation undertaken by
the U.S. corporate business sector. At the same time, because corpora-
tions' securities must be held, a parallel focus is on the behavior of the
markets that price these claims.
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This focus on both the corporate sector and the financial environment
which it confronts is valuable, not only because of corporations' large role
in undertaking the economy's capital formation but also because the
corporate sector context itself helps to define more sharply, and render
more operational for purposes of empirical research, key elements of the
debt and equity financing process. A major advantage at the theoretical
level, for example, is that business corporations, unlike households (and,
by extension, unincorporated businesses for some purposes), do no direct
consumption. A variety of research strategies can therefore conceptually
connect corporate financing to firms' capital formation objectives without
at the same time having to deal with issues affecting consumption-saving
decisions. Major advantages of the corporate sector context at the empir-
ical level include the more formally explicit nature of corporate debt and
equity claims, the superior availability of data summarizing central ele-
ments of corporate financial behavior, and, of course, the availability of
observable market prices for claims that are publicly traded.
The financial capital structure of an economy's business corporations,
either individually or in the aggregate, is the joint product of decisions
taken by claim-issuing corporations on one side and by claim-holding
investors—collectively, "the market"—on the other. The capital struc-
ture existing at any one time reflects the cumulative result of the entire
prior history of corporate decisions on what kind of claims to issue, and
how much of each, in response to the associated history of market prices.
Changes in the capital structure over time in turn reflect corporate
responses either to changing nonfinancial influences or to changes in the
financial market environment, which in turn stem from investors' re-
sponses to a wide variety of further economic and noneconomic factors.
The main goals motivating the research presented here are not only to
advance understanding of the basic behavior connecting debt and equity
financing to physical capital formation in the United States but also, and
more specifically, to assess how the roles in this process of debt and equity
have changed over time.
Within this overall direction, three sets of questions about corporate
sector and financial market behavior emerge as the direct objects of the
research undertaken in these papers. First, what has been the actual
experience of the use of debt and equity financing by U.S. business
corporations in recent years? Have corporate capital structures changed
significantly? It is well known that the use of debt has increased in some
ways, but has the debt component of capital structures actually increased
after allowance for erosion due to the secular upward trends in price
inflation and in nominal interest rates?
Second, what is the relationship (if any) between firms' real investment
decisions and their financial decisions? Does the external environment
that firms face in the product markets help shape their debt and equityCorporate Capital Structure in the United States
decisions? How important are specific institutional factors like taxes, or
arrangements for monitoring performance and contract compliance? Do
firms have individually optimal capital structures? If so, what determines
them? Does the entire corporate sector, or even the entire economy,
have an optimal aggregate capital structure? If so, can identifiable move-
ments in the factors determining it account for the changes in capital
structures that have taken place in recent years?
Third, what factors drive the financial markets' pricing of—that is, the
setting of terms on which investors are willing to hold—debt and equity
securities? Are single-factor models of market pricing behavior ade-
quate? Are securities markets "efficient" in the familiar sense? Are debt
and equity securities substitutes or complements in investors' portfolios?
Have significant changes taken place in recent years in the structure of
equilibrium market prices? If so, can identifiable changes in market risks
or other objective factors, or in investors' assessments of risks, account
for them?
In addition to these substantive questions of economic behavior at the
individual firm and market levels, the work presented here inevitably
addresses several methodological issues, including some that frequently
arise in empirical economic research regardless of its subject, as well as
some that are more specific to the study of corporate capital structures.
What standards are useful for evaluating formal models of behavior? Is
the appropriate use of such models limited to the explanation of observed
behavior, or is prediction also warranted? If the latter, then under what
circumstances? How can empirical research discriminate among compet-
ing hypotheses when key explanatory variables are unobservable, and the
best available proxies for them not only are highly collinear but could
each be proxying for more than one concept? Is it useful to assume that
the market is always "correctly" pricing assets? In what contexts are
market values versus replacement values more relevant? What is the best
way to infer market participants' unobservable assessments from magni-
tudes that are observable? What is the best way to make operational
models relying centrally on aspects of the exchange of information,
including such examples as agency costs and signaling phenomena?
The first three of these ten papers establish the basic empirical facts of
the changes that have (and, in some cases, have not) taken place in U.S.
corporate capital structures and in the financial price and yield rela-
tionships that U.S. corporations have faced in recent years.
Robert A. Taggart's paper, "Secular Patterns in the Financing of
United States Corporations," sets the stage for the entire series of stud-
ies. In it Taggart develops a conceptual framework for thinking about
changes in corporate capital structures and assembles and analyzes rele-
vant time-series data going back in many cases to the beginning of the
twentieth century. He begins by using available aggregate time-seriesBenjamin M. Friedman
data to document the main features of the changes that have occurred
over time. He shows that the use of debt by U.S. corporations has
increased considerably since World War II, but he leaves open the
question of whether current debt levels are high by prewar standards.
The postwar surge in corporate debt certainly appears less dramatic when
viewed in the context of the whole century's experience. Taggart also
documents several other changes that have occurred, including the in-
creasing importance of short-term relative to long-term debt and the
declining importance of new issues of either common or preferred stock
relative to internally generated equity.
In the paper's theoretical sections, Taggart reviews several basic ex-
planations of the determination of firm and/or aggregate corporate capi-
tal structures, including those relying on the trade-off between bank-
ruptcy costs and tax savings from deductibility of interest, on the relative
agency costs of debt and equity, on information transfer problems and
signaling, and on the differential between personal and corporate tax
rates. Taggart lays out the relationships among these four classes of
theories and uses them to examine a series of (at least potentially)
measurable influences on corporate capital structures including tax fac-
tors, price inflation, supplies of competing securities, and the physical
characteristics of corporate investment.
Taggart then asks which among these different explanations could
plausibly account for the changes that have taken place. He concludes
that tax factors in conjunction with inflation have played an important
role but not one sufficient to explain the main trends that have occurred
over long periods of time. He argues that, in addition, supplies of com-
peting securities like government bonds, along with the secular develop-
ment of the nation's financial intermediary system, may also be important
determinants of long-run corporate financing patterns.
John H. Ciccolo and Christopher F. Baum's paper, "Changes in the
Balance Sheet of the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 1926-1977," takes a
closer look at an important slice of the corporate sector's capital structure
on the basis of new data series developed as part of this NBER project
and now available to other researchers. Ciccolo and Baum describe a
micro-level dataset that they developed for a rolling sample of approx-
imately fifty manufacturing firms, spanning a half century and including
for each firm a large number of balance sheet and income account items.
A major contribution of this dataset is the ready availability, for the first
time, of accurate information on the market value of corporations' pub-
licly traded liabilities. In addition, the dataset Ciccolo and Baum de-
veloped provides estimates of the replacement value of firms' physical
assets as well as computations of rates of return based on both market and
replacement values.Corporate Capital Structure in the United States
Ciccolo and Baum show that the chief aggregate features exhibited by
this dataset over time are broadly consistent with the principal develop-
ments documented at the aggregate level by other researchers. The data
show an increasing importance of external funds, and especially of debt,
in financing corporations' physical capital formation. On the asset side,
the data show a substantial decline in corporations' holdings of cash and
short-term marketable securities. Rates of return have declined on bal-
ance within the post-World War II period, but not from the perspective
of a longer time frame. In the latter half of the postwar period, market
valuations of corporations' net assets have declined dramatically in rela-
tion both to replacement values and to realized rates of return.
As an illustration of its potential micro-level applications, Ciccolo and
Baum use the 1927-35 and 1966-77 panels of their dataset to test a simple
portfolio model relating the movements of corporations' key balance
sheet items to changes in their net cash flow and to changes in the ratio of
market to replacement value of their net assets. The principal idea
underlying their model is that firms face different constraints, and there-
fore behave differently, when they are attempting to increase their stock
of physical capital than when they are trying to reduce it. The empirical
results generally support their model for the later period but not the
earlier one.
Patric H. Hendershott and Roger D. Huang's paper, "Debt and Equity
Yields, 1926-1980," provides a parallel review and analysis of the market
prices (yields) that U.S. corporations have faced in deciding on their
capital structures. Hendershott and Huang first document the principal
movements of and interrelationships among debt and equity yields in the
United States over a half century, including both secular and cyclical
movements, and then go on to test several familiar propositions about
yield relationships.
Hendershott and Huang focus in the first instance on corporate bond
and equity yields, the market prices most directly relevant to capital
structure decisions, but for purposes of analysis and comparison their
work also includes the yields on both short- and long-term U.S. Treasury
securities. A familiar result, which their review of the experience of these
yields reinforces, is the contrast between the patterns that have domi-
nated the post-World War II period and the events of the 1930s. A
significant but less familiar result is the appearance of strong regularities
in security yield movements over the business cycle, including systematic
differences in the cyclical movements of ex post returns on bonds and
equities. The strength of equity returns during the year surrounding
business cycle troughs stands out especially clearly.
Hendershott and Huang also investigate several familiar hypotheses
about the determination of debt and equity yields. The principal conclu-Benjamin M. Friedman
sion of their work here is that unanticipated price inflation, which they
represent by the difference between the actual inflation experience and
the corresponding estimate in the Livingston survey, is a major determi-
nant of these yields. Other factors also emerge from their analysis as
bearing on the determination of yields, however, including in particular
measures of real economic activity like industrial production and capacity
utilization.
Against the background of this general review of the experience of
both the quantities and the prices associated with changes in corporate
capital structures in the United States, the next four papers address more
directly the market mechanism determining the prices (yields) of debt
and equity securities. The first two of the four focus on general aspects of
the behavior of investors in debt and equity securities; the next two
examine the market pricing mechanism in contexts specifically related to
actual or potential changes in corporate capital structures.
Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Robert McDonald's paper, "Inflation and
the Role of Bonds in Investor Portfolios," explores both theoretically and
empirically the role of nominal (that is, not indexed) bonds of various
maturities in the portfolios of U.S. investors. A principal goal of their
analysis is to determine whether an investor constrained to hold bonds
only in the form of a single portfolio of nominal debt instruments—as is
the case, for example, in employer-sponsored saving plans offering a
choice between a common stock fund and a single bond fund—will suffer
a serious welfare loss. For this purpose Bodie et al. take as their measure
of the welfare gain or loss due to a given change in the investor's
opportunity set the increment to current wealth needed to offset that
change. A second goal of their analysis is to study the desirability and
feasibility of introducing a market for indexed bonds, offering a riskless
real return, in the United States.
A novel feature of the empirical approach of Bodie et al. is their
method of deriving equilibrium risk premia on the various asset classes
they study. They employ the variance-co variance structure of real returns
computed from historical data for 1953-81, in combination with assump-
tions about net asset supplies and about the economy's overall average
degree of risk aversion, to derive estimates of these risk premia. By using
this procedure they circumvent the problems that would be associated
with estimating risk premia on the basis of historical mean returns, which
are sometimes negative.
Bodie et al. conclude that a substantial loss in welfare can be associated
with participation in a saving plan offering a choice only between a
diversified common stock fund and an intermediate-term bond fund.
They argue that it is possible to eliminate most of this loss, however, by
introducing, as a third option in such plans, a fund consisting of short-Corporate Capital Structure in the United States
term money market instruments. Bodie et al. also conclude that the
potential welfare gain from introducing explicitly indexed bonds in the
U.S. financial market is probably not large enough to justify the costs of
innovation by private issuers. The major reason the gain would be so
small is that one-month U.S. Treasury bills, with their small variance of
real returns, already constitute an effective substitute for indexed bonds
in investors' portfolios.
My own paper, "The Substitutability of Debt and Equity Securities,"
investigates empirically the degree of substitutability between debt and
equity securities in the United States. The analysis first applies fun-
damental relationships connecting portfolio choices with expected asset
returns to infer key asset substitutabilities directly from the observed
variance-covariance structure of U.S. asset returns, using quarterly data
for 1960-80. It then compares these implied substitutabilities with the
corresponding econometrically estimated portfolio behavior of U.S.
households.
The resulting evidence provides little ground for any conclusion about
even the sign, much less the magnitude, of the substitutability of short-
term debt and equity. Although the implied optimal behavior indicates
that these two assets are substitutes, the observed behavior indicates that
households have treated them as complements. By contrast, the evidence
consistently indicates that long-term debt and equity are substitutes.
Moreover, with a few exceptions the empirical estimates of the associated
substitution elasticity are quite closely clustered around the value - .035.
The conclusion that long-term debt and equity are substitutes with
elasticity — .035 bears mixed implications for broader economic and
financial questions. At one level, the finding that the two assets are
indeed substitutes validates the standard assumption underlying a variety
of familiar models in both corporate finance and monetary economics. At
the same time, if the absolute magnitude of the elasticity of substitution is
so small, then many of these models' more important substantive conclu-
sions do not follow.
E. Philip Jones, Scott P. Mason, and Eric Rosenfeld's paper, "Contin-
gent Claims Valuation of Corporate Liabilities: Theory and Empirical
Tests," addresses the specific question of how the financial markets value
the complicated securities, encumbered by numerous covenants and
indenture provisions, that U.S. corporations typically issue. The central
tool in their analysis is the familiar contingent claims models, which
applies to the pricing of corporate liabilities the fundamental insight that
every corporate security is a contingent claim on the value of the under-
lying firm. Hence it is possible to model the financial markets' pricing of
these securities via an arbitrage logic that is independent of the specific
equilibrium structure of risk and return. If this model is correct, then the8 Benjamin M. Friedman
price of every security depends in a formally quantifiable way on the rate
of return on riskless assets and on the issuing firm's market value and the
volatility of that value.
Jones et al. lay out the basic theory of the contingent claims model,
extend it to cover such practically relevant special cases as multiple debt
issues of a single firm and debt issues with sinking funds (with and without
an option to double the associated payment schedule), and then test the
expanded theory using monthly 1975-82 data on the actual market prices
of 177 bonds issued by 15 U.S. corporations. Even though they restrict
their sample to corporations with relatively simple capital structures, the
numerical solution of the model to derive predicted securities prices is
complex. The required data include interest rates, volatility of firms'
market values, and specific aspects of the bonds' indentures including
principal amount outstanding, coupon rate, call price schedule and defer-
ment period, and sinking fund schedule and associated options.
Jones et al. conclude that their empirical results do not warrant using
the model, in its conventional form, as a practical basis for valuing
corporate securities. Although there is almost no systematic bias in the
pricing errors that the model makes for the sample as a whole, the model
does systematically over- or underprice bonds with specific characteris-
tics. In particular, the model tends to underprice less risky bonds and
overprice more risky bonds. This failure leads Jones et al. to suggest that
several of the standard assumptions underlying contingent claims analysis
in its usual form are inconsistent with the actual workings of the U.S.
financial markets.
Wayne H. Mikkelson's paper, "Capital Structure Change and De-
creases in Stockholders' Wealth: A Cross-sectional Study of Convertible
Security Calls," examines the financial markets' pricing of corporate
securities in the specific context of the changes in common stock values
that occur when firms call outstanding convertible debt or preferred
stock. The goals of the paper are to investigate the potential determinants
of the usually observed negative common stock price reaction to the
announcement of a convertible security call forcing conversion and, on
the basis of this analysis, to draw inferences about the pricing of corpo-
rate securities and hence about the determination of corporate capital
structures more generally.
Mikkelson's empirical work relates the observed changes in common
stock prices following 164 convertible security calls made by U.S. cor-
porations during 1962-78 to several quantifiable effects associated with
these calls, including the change in interest expense tax shields, the
potential redistribution of wealth from common stockholders to holders
of debt or preferred stock, the decrease in value of the conversion option
held by owners of the convertible securities, the increase in the number of
common shares outstanding, and the change in earnings per share.Corporate Capital Structure in the United States
Among these various effects, only the reduction in interest expense tax
shields exhibits a significant relationship to the change in common stock
price.
Mikkelson argues that this result is consistent with systematic reduc-
tions in common stock prices due not only to reductions in interest
expense tax shields, as would be implied by theories relating optimal
capital structure to tax factors, but also to the negative information about
corporations' earnings prospects conveyed by convertible security calls.
He therefore concludes that this evidence is also consistent with theories
which relate capital structure to earnings prospects and hence which
imply that reductions in leverage convey unfavorable information about
firm value.
The last three papers examine directly the observed capital structures
of U.S. corporations, emphasizing in particular the question of the rela-
tionship (if any) of capital structure decisions to corporations' real-sector
behavior.
Alan J. Auerbach's paper, "Real Determinants of Corporate Lever-
age," focuses on one of the key factors underlying several familiar
theories of optimal corporate capital structures: the role of taxes. Auer-
bach argues that the U.S. corporate income tax distorts corporations'
real-sector behavior, via the variation in depreciation allowances and
investment tax credit provisions across different types of physical invest-
ments, and also distorts financial behavior via the differential treatment
of debt and equity returns. The object of his analysis of corporations' real
and financial decisions is to determine the extent to which these biases
offset one another.
Auerbach's model connecting firms' real and financial behavior rests
on the idea that corporations prefer to finance different physical invest-
ments in different ways. Such behavior would be important in this context
because the conclusion that tax effects bias investment choices is neces-
sarily valid only if a separation prevails between real and financial deci-
sions. For example, if a corporation's optimal capital structure depends
on a tax advantage to debt financing which is dissipated by risk-related
costs as the firm's leverage increases, and if these risk-related costs in turn
depend on the firm's investment mix, then the resulting financial bias in
favor of investing in structures could offset the initial tax bias in favor of
investing in equipment.
Auerbach's empirical work, based on 1958-77 data for a panel of 189
U.S. corporations, suggests that observed patterns of real and financial
behavior are only partially consistent with familiar theories of optimal
capital structure based on tax factors and costs connected to agency
considerations and risks of bankruptcy. The effect of firms' growth rates
on their borrowing is inconsistent with the predictions of models based on
agency costs. In addition, although the effect of the tax loss carry-forward10 Benjamin M. Friedman
is consistent with models based on tax shields, the effect of earnings
variance is not. Auerbach also concludes that there is no obvious financial
offset to the tax bias against investment in structures since, on the whole,
firms do not appear to borrow more to invest in structures than in
equipment.
Michael S. Long and Ileen B. Malitz's paper, "Investment Patterns and
Financial Leverage," focuses on another of the major elements under-
lying familiar theories of corporate capital structures: the role of invest-
ment opportunities. Here, too, an important implication of such models
is that corporations' real and financial decisions are connected. In this
case the connection takes the form of a systematic bias toward underin-
vestment when firms with risky debt outstanding act in the interest of
their shareholders. One potential role of complex covenants in debt
contracts is to alleviate this problem.
Long and Malitz argue that, because growth opportunities that are
firm-specific and intangible (and hence unobservable) reduce the effec-
tiveness of debt covenants, corporations with a high proportion of their
investment opportunities in intangible form can limit the agency costs of
their debt only by limiting the amount of risky debt that they have
outstanding. Conversely, corporations with a high proportion of their
investment opportunities in the form of tangible assets like capital equip-
ment can support a greater level of debt. Hence a key determinant of
optimal corporate capital structure is the specific type of investment
opportunity that the firm faces.
Long and Malitz present empirical results, based on 1978-80 data for a
sample of 545 U.S. corporations, that provide evidence in support of such
a relationship between real and financial behavior. In particular, their
results show that corporations which invest heavily in intangibles—re-
search and development, for example, or advertising—systematically
rely less on debt than do corporations which invest largely in tangibles.
These results also stand up in the presence of other variables like tax
factors that represent alternative explanations of capital structure deci-
sions, although there is evidence that the most important single determi-
nant of corporations' borrowing decisions remains the availability of
internal funds.
Finally, A. Michael Spence's paper, "Capital Structure and the Corpo-
ration's Product Market Environment," examines the question of a re-
lationship between corporations' real and financial behavior from a dif-
ferent perspective. Spence argues that, if choosing an optimal capital
structure is a way for a corporation to reduce its costs in some relevant
sense, then corporations facing greater competitive pressure in their
product markets will have a greater incentive, and hence a greater
tendency, to do so than will corporations enjoying more sheltered com-
petitive environments. Alternatively, if theories treating financial struc-11 Corporate Capital Structure in the United States
ture as irrelevant are correct, then there will be no observed connection
between competitive product markets and observed patterns of corpo-
rate capital structures.
Spence tests this hypothesis by relating the observed interfirm variance
of capital structures to measures of product market competitive pressure
for 1,183 U.S. corporations in 403 four-digit industries. His measures of
competitiveness include returns earned by firms as well as variables
directly and indirectly reflecting entry barriers and potential oligopolistic
consensus. Spence also includes in the empirical work measures of prod-
uct market diversification for each firm, so as to be able to distinguish
results based on the full sample from results based on a smaller sample of
relatively undiversified firms.
Spence finds that, although industry product market environments
help explain the returns that firms earn and also bear systematic rela-
tionships to firms' actual capital structures, they apparently do not much
influence intra-industry deviations of firms' capital structures from the
respective implied industry optima. One possible explanation for this
negative result, of course, is that capital structure does not strongly
influence corporations' costs or hence their total value—in other words,
that there exists no optimal capital structure. The positive results that
emerge seem inconsistent with this view, however. An alternative ex-
planation is that, while optimal capital structures do exist, the factors that
give rise to them simply do not become significantly more influential in
more competitive environments.
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